Russia expressed readiness to admit Iran into the SCO following the process of admission of India and Pakistan. The fact that several days prior to the 2010 summit both Russia and China supported UNSC Resolution 1929, which imposed crippling economic sanctions on Iran, suggests that it was a move directed at Tehran and allegedly supported by Russia with an eye on improving US-Russia relations.įast forward to 2015 and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) resulted in the easing of multilateral sanctions on Iran. In 2010, the SCO introduced a new criterion for membership that excluded aspiring member states under sanctions by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). It also came at a time when Russia’s foreign policy priority was to reset its relations with Washington. Moscow would have suffered greater reputational costs from closer association with Tehran, particularly due to the latter’s brutal crackdown on protesters during the 2009 post-election protests known as the Green Movement and then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s confrontations with the West over its controversial nuclear program. However, Russia was dissuaded from including Tehran’s membership application as an agenda item during the summit. Within the SCO, Russia has oscillated between adopting an ambiguous position on Iranian membership and serving as Iran’s most prominent advocate. With Moscow holding the rotating presidency of the SCO at the 2009 summit, Iran anticipated an upgrade from its observer status to admission as a full member. Whereas Iran’s relationship with China has received much attention in the context of the SCO, the significance of the organization for Russia-Iran relations remains understudied. The decision to extend membership to Tehran-the culmination of more than a decade of setbacks-reflects the burgeoning ties between Iran and Russia.Īs part of Iran’s emphasis on ties to the East-a policy that has received extra impetus amid stalled talks over the revival of the 2015 nuclear accord-the country’s involvement in the SCO is tied to its goal of deepening and institutionalizing its relations with China and Russia. On September 17, at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s (SCO) summit in Dushanbe, the Russian and Chinese-led bloc agreed to move forward on Iran’s application for membership. The views expressed by the authors are theirs and not their institutions’. The authors are associated with the initiative’s Working Group on Chinese and Russian Power Projection in the Middle East. This article is part of a strategic collaboration launched by the Atlantic Council (Washington, DC), the Emirates Policy Center (Abu Dhabi), and the Institute for National Security Studies (Tel Aviv). OctoWhat does Russia get out of Iran’s membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization?
0 kommentar(er)
